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A RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE?: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Dieter Giesent
I. INTRODUCTION
THE EXISTENCE OF A RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE hasbeen one of the most problematic and debated issues in med-
ical ethics and medical law. In a world of scarce resources,
budgetary constraints and ever-increasing demand, the value of
asserting a right to health care has become apparent to those
who seek to shield existing services from cutbacks and to ex-
tend access to medical care to disadvantaged groups in society.
In the course of this article, some of the practical legal implica-
tions of recognizing a right to health care will be examined
from a comparative perspective. At the outset it is important to
distinguish between 1) claims made by individuals upon society
in general to ensure access to health care, and 2) claims made
by those in need of treatment upon individual doctors to ensure
that vital medical assistance is afforded, especially in times of
emergency. In establishing the general structures for the provi-
sion of health care and in determining the extent of a doctor's
liability for refusal to treat a patient in need, the law plays a
pivotal role in enforcing the ethical norms of any given society.
A comparison will show that, at first blush, the relevant legal
rules vary considerably, reflecting differing political and philo-
t Dean of Law, Head of the Working Centre for Studies in German and Interna-
tional Medical Malpractice Law, Professor of Private and Comparative Law, Faculty of
Law at the Free University of Berlin, Germany. The author gratefully acknowledges the
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rington, LL.M, B.C.L., Research Assistant at the Working Centre, 1992-93.
The author wishes to let it be known that he disagrees with the way the footnotes have
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sophical priorities. In many common law countries, especially
the U.S., an austere individualism is favored at the expense of
the elementary obligations of common humanity and solidarity
which are acknowledged by almost all the civil law jurisdic-
tions. Nonetheless, the extreme libertarianism of the Anglo-
Saxon world has been considerably tempered and modified such
that at the societal and individual levels, access to medical ser-
vices has been expanded, albeit in an indirect fashion. In spite
of these advances, a comparative analysis will also highlight
outstanding deficiencies in the legal rules governing access to
health care in a number of jurisdictions, deficiencies which are
at odds with the expressed value-commitments of these
societies.
Once a discussion of the question of access to health care
as a matter of rights and obligations has begun, consistency
demands that the issues arising within the therapeutic context
also be considered from a normative perspective. The individual
who submits himself to medical procedures does not for that
reason forfeit any of the fundamental rights which the law of
all civilized nations recognizes him as holding. This view of the
patient, qua an autonomous subject of the law, as central to the
health care system has important implications for contempo-
rary medical practice and for judicial attitudes thereto.
II. THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1
states that:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and his family, including
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services, and the right to security in the event of unemploy-
ment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack
of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.2
1. (1948), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ESSENTIAL TREATIES AND OTHER
RELEVANT DOCUMENTS 437 (I. Von Munch & A. Buske eds., 1985).
2. Id. (emphasis added). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948. See Louis B
SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 33 (1973).
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Although this provision has been strongly influential in the
post-war world, its identification of an affirmative right to
health care can at best be seen only as aspirational. The asser-
tion of a right to medical services founders upon difficulties of
political philosophy, and such a right is not recognized by the
legal system of any democratic society. Unlike the classic rights
to "negative" liberty, as first embodied in the U.S. Constitution
and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, which re-
strain the state from the arbitrary and oppressive use of its
powers, a right to health care would allow the individual plain-
tiff, by means of litigation, to oblige the state to allocate re-
sources to a specific extent and for a specific purpose. Yet the
availability of such a remedy would clearly overturn the collec-
tive decision-making process as performed by the legislative
arm of government. It is for this reason that courts in many
jurisdictions have been firm in rejecting claims for an affirma-
tive right to health care services, as beyond the scope of the
adjudicative function.' As the English Court of Appeal stated,
"it is not for this court, or any court, to substitute its own judg-
ment for the judgment of those who are responsible for the al-
location of resources. . . .The courts of this country cannot
arrange the [waiting] lists in the hospital ....
It was the open-ended and inchoate nature of the putative
right to health care that led the U.S. President's Commission
to agree that, as long as the ethical and jurisprudential debate
on access to health care was focused upon attempts to assert
and refute a right to medical services, it could provide no useful
guidance to those involved in formulating law and policy in the
health care sector.5 This admission does not, however, exhaust
3. E.g., R. v. Central Birmingham Health Authority, ex parte Collier, (Eng. C.A.
Jan. 6, 1988) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file); R. v. Central Birmingham Health Au-
thority, ex parte Walker, 04 3 B.L.M.R. 32 (Eng. C.A. Nov. 25, 1987), available in
LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) ("The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay
the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay the medical
expenses of indigents." (cite omitted)). See also IAN KENNEDY & ANDREW GRUBB. MEDI-
CAL LAW. TEXT AND MATERIALS 389-99 (1989) (providing exerpts from several British
cases).
4. Central Birmingham Health Authority, ex parte Collier, at *3.
5. 1 US PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH. SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE A
REPORT ON THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF
HEALTH SERVICES 34-35 (1983) [hereinafter SECURING ACCESS].
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ethical and legal consideration of access to health care, for the
concept of a moral right clearly must be distinguished from
that of a moral obligation. While all moral rights necessarily
entail moral obligations (i.e., to ensure that the appropriate en-
titlements are met), the existence of moral obligations does not
in every instance imply the existence of correlative moral
rights. Thus, as the President's Commission said, most appo-
sitely, "a person may have a moral obligation to help those in
need, even though the needy cannot, strictly speaking, demand
that person's aid as something they are due."'
The autonomy of the individual citizen has been recog-
nized as the core value of the legal and constitutional order,
both in civil law and common law countries.7 In addition, it
must be acknowledged that individuals require a minimum
level of health and physical well-being in order to develop au-
tonomously their life-styles and to fulfill their goals in accor-
dance with their value commitments. As such, health may be
viewed as a basic good, an essential prerequisite to the exercise
of personal autonomy and an irreducible condition of human
flourishing.8 To the extent that any society denies access to ba-
sic health care services, it disvalues individual autonomy and
thereby exposes itself to serious moral criticism. 9
Among the democratic states of the developed world, the
moral force of this obligation is borne out by the prevalence of
state-funded health-care systems. Thus, the British National
Health Service Acts require the Secretary of State to provide
such accommodation, facilities and staff as are necessary to
meet the reasonable requirements of the health service.10 In
6. Id. at 34; see also R. v. Instan, [1893] 1 Q.B. 450, 543-44 (Coleridge, L., Eng.).
7. In England: Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hosp. Governors, [1985] 1 All E.R. 643,
649. In Germany: GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 1, 2; Judgment of Dec. 9, 1958,
BGH, 29 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 46. In the U.S.:
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). For compara-
tive references, see Dieter Giesen, From Paternalism to Self-determination to Shared De-
cision Making, 1988 ACTA JURIDICA 107 (S. Afr.).
8. Although a detailed philosophical discussion is beyond the scope of this article,
the following may be profitably referred to: JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS 100-160 (1980); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 400-429 (1986); John
A. Hayes, Health Care as a Natural Right, 11 MED. LAW 405, 406-407 (1992).
9. SECURING ACCESS, supra note 5, at 34.
10. National Health Service Act 1977, ch. 49, § 3 (Eng.) obliges the Secretary of
State to provide accommodation, medical, dental, nursing and ambulance facilities, facili-
ties for expectant and nursing mothers, facilities for ill persons (i.e. preventive care, active
care and after care) and services for the diagnosis and treatment of illness. Similar provi-
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Sweden, a directly funded national health-care system is also in
place. A differently funded, but no less comprehensive coverage
is achieved in Canada through government financing of pri-
vately run health-care structures. A duty upon the state to pro-
vide for medical assistance also may be inferred from Article
20(1) of the German Federal Constitution which states that:
"The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social
federal state."'1 This concept of a "Sozialstaat" is imple-
mented by the provision of a state-run health insurance
scheme, in addition to a range of private health insurance pro-
grams, which ensures that all German citizens have access to
medical attention and hospital care when it is necessary.
Of course, it must be acknowledged that aspects of these
various systems have been rightly criticized as often wasteful
and inefficient.' 2 A combination of rising public expectations,
the expansionist dynamic of medical science and increasing de-
mands upon finite public resources have necessitated careful
scrutiny of health care expenditures.13 Furthermore, it has been
shown that a concentration upon highly expensive medical
technology of limited use has reinforced pre-existing inequali-
ties of access.' 4 Thus, in Britain, the Black Report, which re-
grettably did not receive adequate attention from health policy-
makers, noted marked discrepancies between the health of dif-
ferent income groups and regions and found that mortality
levels rose inversely with falling occupation rank or status.1 5
sions apply in Scotland under the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978, ch. 29,
Part II, § 18.
11. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 20(1) (F.R.G.) (emphasis added), re-
printed & translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 90 (Albert P.
Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz eds., 1991).
12. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY: READINGS.
NOTES. AND QUESTIONS chs. 1, 2, 8-10 (1988); Harry Schwartz, Access, Equity, and
Equality in American Medical Care, in 2 US. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH. SECUR-
ING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE
AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES 67 app. D at 74-76 (1983) [hereinafter APPENDICES:
SOCIOCULTURAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES].
13. For a compelling critique of "medical imperialism" and its often disastrous con-
sequences, see IVAN ILLICH. MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EXPROPRIATION OF HEALTH (1976).
14. See DIETER GIESEN. INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW. A COMPAR-
ATIVE LAW STUDY OF CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM MEDICAL CARE 1 1470-93 (1988).
15. SIR DOUGLAS BLACK ET. AL., INEQUALITIES IN HEALTH. THE BLACK REPORT 63-
64. (1982); see also IAN KENNEDY. THE UNMASKING OF MEDICINE 58 (1981). Note: the
recent British Government White Paper, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH. THE HEALTH
OF THE NATION. A STRATEGY FOR HEALTH IN ENGLAND (1992), while commendably em-
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The development of efficient and more equitable strategies for
the prevention of ill-health has been hindered by many doctors'
view of themselves as "scientist problem solvers and curers"'16
and their correspondingly insatiable desire for costly new tech-
niques and equipment.' 7 Notwithstanding these forceful criti-
cisms, it is clear that the moral obligation to provide access to
adequate medical facilities is honored to a significant extent in
each of the countries mentioned. This is made especially clear
when the existing health care structures in the U.S. are
examined.
The authors of a leading American health law textbook
have correctly asserted that "virtually every developed national
in the world except the United States assures universal access
to health care."' 8 The strong tradition of individualism in
American political culture emphasizes that health care is
largely a matter of private interest, the allocation of which is
best left to the market. This tradition has, however, been modi-
fied by the acknowledgement of certain community obligations
to provide minimal facilities and, indeed, a statutory or consti-
tutional duty to provide at least some services for the indigent
is recognized in all but three states.' 9 Consequently, the cover-
age available to individuals in the event of ill-health is made up
of an uneven patchwork of individual insurance schemes, em-
ployment-related schemes and a number of federally sanctioned
initiatives to assist the needy.20 The latter are chiefly comprised
of the Medicare scheme, which provides for the health needs of
the elderly and the "medically needy", and the Medicaid
scheme, which makes treatment available to the "deserving"
poor. "'
phasizing the need to strengthen preventive medical practice, ignores many of the criti-
cisms contained in the Black Report.
16. GIESEN, supra note 14, at 1 1446.
17. Id. at % 1442-1513; see also KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 70-75.
18. BARRY R. FURROW ET. AL.. HEALTH LAW: CASES. MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS
602 (2nd ed. 1991).
19. Id. at 601.
20. SECURING ACCESS, supra note 5, at 115-182 (detailing various health insurance
and medical assistance schemes). See also FURROW ET AL, supra note 18, at 529-599.
21. A rare and useful philosophical exploration of the concept of the "deserving"
poor is provided by George Sher, Health Care and the "Deserving Poor", in APPENDICES
SOCIOCULTURAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, supra note 12, at 293 app. L.
282 [Vol. 4:277
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While Medicare generally has been successful, this has not
been true of Medicaid. 22 The exacting criteria for Medicaid as-
sistance, whereby most single persons and couples without chil-
dren are excluded as "undeserving" poor, have meant that only
about fifty percent of persons below the federal poverty stan-
dard are covered.23 This in turn has led to the alarming statis-
tics that approximately fourteen percent of the U.S. population
were completely uninsured in 1992 and approximately six per-
cent were underinsured.24 Indeed, one commentator has noted
the emergence of a new category of "medically excluded" per-
sons, whose incomes are insufficient to meet the costs of private
insurance, but sufficiently high to put them just beyond the
reach of the Medicaid program.25 In addition, escalating price
inflation in the medical sector as a whole has meant that levels
of reimbursement to doctors attending to Medicaid patients are
generally viewed as inadequate, 6 with the result that large
numbers of badly needed physicians have forsaken the inner
cities and poorer rural areas for more lucrative practices in the
suburbs. 27 These difficulties have been exacerbated by eco-
nomic measures which have crudely reduced the number of ser-
vices available to Medicaid recipients, rather than tackling the
22. See Daniel Callahan, Medical Futility, Medical Necessity: The-Problem-With-
out-A-Name 21 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jul.-Aug. 1991, at 32.
23. SECURING ACCESS, supra note 5, at 95 (noting that "[t]he income eligibility lim-
its for Medicaid . . . are generally more restrictive than the national poverty guidelines").
24. Bush, Clinton Health Care Plans Analyzed in Families USA/Lewin-ICF Analy-
sis Performed Under Auspices of Bipartisan Committee, HEALTH NEws DAILY, Oct: 2,
1992, available in Westlaw, HND Database (citing U.S. Dept of Labor estimates); see
also, SECURING ACCESS, supra note 5, at 92-100. As it was put recently, "[i]nstead of
rationing medical services themselves, as the United Kingdom does in order to provide
everyone basic care, United States health insurance mechanisms simply 'ration' uninsured
individuals away from medical treatment altogether." Frances H. Miller, Denial of Health
Care and Informed Consent in English and American Law, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 37, 42
(1992).
25. See Paul Starr, Medical Care and the Pursuit of Equality in America, in Ap-
PENDICES: SOCIOCULTURAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, supra note 12, at 3 app. A (dis-
cussing the development of marginal inequality in medical care and the rise in employee
health benefit plans). See also HAVIGHURST, supra note 12, at 40-46; see generally id.
especially at 65, 111, 140.
26. See SECURING ACCESS, supra note 5, at 183-197 (recognizing a growing concern
by the American public that rising costs do not result in increased benefits).
27. For an examination of the wide variations in the ratio of physicians to population
in the U.S. and the corresponding differences in levels of health, see John L.S. Holloman
Jr., Access to Health Care, in APPENDICES: SOCIOCULTURAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL STUD-
les, supra note 12, at 79 app. E at 84-85.
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root causes of medical expansionism in general.2 8 It is, there-
fore, no surprise that the U.S. President's Commission found
that levels of ill-health were considerably higher among low-
income groups and traditionally disadvantaged minorities in
American society. Bearing this in mind, it is hoped that Presi-
dent Bill Clinton will remain true to his undertaking to effect a
far-reaching reform of the U.S. health care system.30
III. MEDICAL EMERGENCY AND THE DUTY TO
RESCUE
The absence of a comprehensive health care system in the
U.S., with access predicated upon need, is felt most acutely in
cases of medical emergency. In this context, this article is most
appropriately focused upon the existence and extent of the
moral and legal duty upon medical professionals and hospital
authorities to effectively rescue an individual whose health and
life is in grave danger by affording urgently required treat-
ment. In dealing with the question of whether the moral duty
to render emergency medical assistance as embodied in the
parable of the Good Samaritan 1 is to be converted into a legal
duty, the approaches of the common law and civil law jurisdic-
tions have diverged considerably.
The individualist bias already noted in this article in con-
nection with the U.S. health care system is also manifested in
the refusal of courts in common law countries to impose liabil-
ity for failure to act to prevent harm or nonfeasance as distin-
guished from affirmative misconduct or misfeasance. 2 In the
medical context, this has meant that a doctor "may flout his
Hippocratic oath and deny aid to a stranger, even in an emer-
gency like a road accident." 33 Indeed, in a leading decision of
28. Thus, while the recent reforms of the Oregon Medicaid program have expanded
the number of persons covered, it has been shown that the state's novel system of "fluid
prioritization" of available health care benefits will disadvantage children and pregnant
women considerably. See Sarah Rosenbaum, Mothers and Children Last: The Oregon
Medicaid Experiment, 18 AM. JL. & MED. 97 (1992).
29. SECURING ACCESS, supra note 5, at 49-113.
30. "'A compassionate government,' says Clinton, 'must extend care to the 37 mil-
lion people in the U.S. who have no medical insurance.'" George J. Church, His Seven
Most Urgent Decisions, TIME, Jan. 25, 1993, at 30.
31. See ST. LUKE 10:25-37.
32. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 3,
56 (5th ed. 1984).
33. JOHN G. FLEMING. THE LAW OF TORTS 147 (8th ed. 1992).
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the High Court of Australia, it was stated that in the parable
of the Good Samaritan "both priest and Levite ensured per-
formance of any common law duty of care to the stricken trav-
eller when, by crossing to the other side of the road, they
avoided any risk of throwing up dust in his wounds." ' 4 By con-
trast, the civil law jurisdictions have not been so timorous
about obliging rescue in emergency situations, and failure to do
so in certain clearly defined circumstances will incur criminal
and civil sanctions.35
Supporters of the common law position have argued that
to impose such a duty upon doctors would deprive them of their
right to contract freely for the provision of medical services
and, thereby, would amount to a morally unacceptable appro-
priation of their labor. 6 This analysis, however, ignores signifi-
cant aspects of the relationship 1) between doctors and society
and 2) between doctors and their individual patients. Funda-
mentally, the practice of medicine is subject to the licensing
powers of state authorities and is confined to a select and well-
remunerated body of professionals. Furthermore, the newly
graduated doctor owes a considerable debt to society - his
training having been funded by enormous state investment and
his clinical experience having been gained through practice
upon willing patients, a disproportionate number of whom will
themselves have been indigent.3 7 Clearly, a doctor required to
provide vital treatment in an emergency situation is not "giving
something for nothing." In addition, the characterization of the
doctor-patient relationship as a series of arms-length transac-
tions solely rooted in the law of contract is wholly at odds with
existing law and with the ancient ethical traditions of the medi-
cal profession.3" Fiduciary duties of disclosure, confidentiality
and respect for the patient's fundamental human interests, im-
34. Jaensch v. Coffey, 155 C.L.R. 549, 579 (Austl. 1984).
35. Code p6nal [C. PtN.] art. 63 (Fr.); Code p6nal [C. PtN.] art. 422 (Belg.);
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] (Penal Code) § 21 (Aus.); Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] (Penal Code)
§ 323c (F.R.G.). See also GIESEN, supra note 14, 713-29 (1988).
36. See Robert M. Sade, Medical Care as a Right: A Refutation, 285 NEw ENG. J.
MED 1288 (1971).
37. Holloman, supra note 27, at 92-93.
38. It is submitted that a covenant based analysis of the duties of the individual
doctor and of the medical profession as a whole more faithfully represents the realities of
social practice and ethical understanding. See William F. May, Code, Covenant, Contract,
or Philanthropy, 516 HASTINGS CTR. REP. Dec. 1975, at 29.
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posed upon doctors by law, recognize the heightened vulnera-
bility and dependency of patients.3 9 This position of patient
weakness is at its most extreme in emergency cases, where it is
impossible, as a matter of fact, for individuals to negotiate con-
tractual terms or to seek alternative sources of care.
There have, however, been a number of attempts to mod-
ify the common law position to the advantage of patients in
need through a range of legislative strategies and a significant
body of case law designed to "force rescue" in emergency situ-
ations. Thus, in the U.S. the Hill-Burton Act of 1946,40 which
provided federal funding for the construction and expansion of
hospitals, authorized the federal agency responsible to require
assurances from applicants for funding that a measure of hos-
pital care would be provided free of charge to indigent pa-
tients.41 Furthermore, over half of the U.S. state governments
have enacted legislation requiring all general and surgical hos-
pitals to provide emergency care as a condition of their being
licensed to operate.4" Regrettably, however, it must be admit-
ted that these measures have not had a very substantial impact
due to widespread non-compliance and under-enforcement.43
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
198544 requires all hospitals participating in the Medicare
scheme, which have appropriate facilities, to provide treatment
to stabilize an emergency condition, to provide assistance to a
woman in active labor or to provide for an appropriate transfer
of either type of patient to another medical facility (i.e. where
39. For a comparative analysis with copious references, see GIESEN, supra note 14,
11 482-729 (1988) (duty of disclosure); id. at 1 833-90 (duty of confidentiality and pa-
tient-physician communication). This analysis is illustrated by recent North American case
law from the U.S. and Canada. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d
479 (Cal. 1990) (doctor required by law to disclose any financial or scientific interest he
may have in a patient's course of treatment); Norberg v. Weinrib, 92 D.L.R. 4th 449 (Can.
1992) (doctor required by law not only to protect a patient's narrow legal and economic
interests, but also fundamental human interests).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1982).
41. FURROW ET. AL, supra note 18, at 628-629 (synopsis of legislative history and of
litigation concerning subsequent regulations for the Act.). Note also that discrimination on
grounds of race, color or national origin under any program or activity receiving federal
funding is subject to review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1982).
42. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111.5, para. 86 (1969); CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 1317.2-.2a, §§ 1798.170-.172 (West 1990).
43. See KAREN H. ROTHENBERG, Who Cares?: The Evolution of the Legal Duty to
Provide Emergency Care, 26 Hou. L. REV. 21, 54, 59 (1989).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988).
[Vol. 4:277
A RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE?
the benefits of transferring the patient outweigh the burdens of
doing so). The effectiveness of this statute is increased by the
inclusion of a "civil enforcement" provision allowing a patient
who has been injured by a hospital's violation of the provisions
of the statute to obtain damages and equitable relief.45
Although in the absence of a contractual agreement a doc-
tor is under no common-law duty to render emergency treat-
ment as was found in the Arizona case of Hiser v. Randolph,48
courts have shown a notable desire to circumvent the harsher
implications of this rule.47 Thus, it has been held in both Eng-
land and the U.S. that, when a patient presents himself at a
health care facility in reliance upon the established custom of
that facility to afford emergency treatment, a doctor who ref-
uses to attend to him will be liable for medical malpractice,48
as will the hospital itself by way of vicarious or direct liabil-
ity.49 Similarly, a doctor who discontinues a necessary course of
treatment without making adequate provision for his replace-
ment by another physician will be liable under the law of negli-
gence for abandonment.5 ° In an expansive interpretation of
when such a course of treatment can be said to have com-
menced, the Supreme Court of Mississippi has held that where
the plaintiff "was recorded as an emergency room patient, and
remained there two hours . . . the Hospital and its employees
had a duty to use reasonable care in protecting his life and well
being. 51 It has also been held that, where state regulations and
licensing conditions require hospitals to maintain emergency
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (d)(3)(A) (1986) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
(d)(2)(A) (1988)). See Owens v. Nacogdoches County Hosp. Dist., 741 F. Supp. 1269
(E.D. Tex. 1990) (successful invocation of this provision by a woman who had been trans-
ferred, just prior to going into labor, by defendant to a distant hospital solely on the basis
of her indigence).
46. Hiser v. Randolph, 617 P.2d 774 (Ariz. 1980) (holding defendant-doctor was
bound by his contract of employment which obliged him to render emergency treatment).
47. See ROTHENBERG, supra note 43 (providing a thorough discussion of American
developments in this regard).
48. Barnett v. Chelsea & Kensington Hosp. Mgmt. Comm., [1969] 1 Q.B. 428
(Eng.) (denying claim, however, because plaintiff was unable to establish an adequate
causal link between omission to treat and death of decedent); see also Wilmington Gen.
Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 140 (Del. 1961).
49. For a comparative discussion of the vicarious and direct liability of hospital au-
thorities, see GIESEN. supra note 14, at W 50-106.
50. See id. at 724.
51. New Biloxi Hosp., Inc. v. Frazier, 146 So. 2d 882, 887 (Miss. 1962).
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rooms, access to these facilities cannot be denied solely on the
basis of an inability to pay.52
The enactment in many American jurisdictions of so-
called Good Samaritan statutes is a further development in-
tended to ameliorate the situation of patients in urgent need of
treatment.53 These statutes, which only apply outside the hospi-
tal context, are intended to provide an incentive to doctors to
fulfill their ethical obligations in this regard by generally im-
posing liability upon them only where they have been grossly
negligent in the provision of emergency treatment. 54 As Profes-
sor and now Justice Linden stated, this affirmative action rule
"does not inhibit would-be rescuers while at the same time is
not too inviting to bunglers. 55 It is submitted, however, that
these statutes, which are the result of "active lobbying by med-
ical associations," 56 represent a wholly anomalous and unac-
ceptable exception to the general law of negligence. While it
has been widely affirmed that in determining whether a defend-
ant is liable in negligence courts must take into account the
objective circumstances in which he found himself,57 this does
not mean that at common law a different, lower standard of
care is applied to conduct in emergency situations. Rather, it
has been held in England for example that, once a rescue at-
tempt has been commenced, the rescuer must comply with the
standard of care of the reasonable man in the particular cir-
cumstances.5 There would appear to be no principled reason
for extending favorable treatment to the medical profession in
this regard. Furthermore, doctors' fears of a flood of litigation
are wholly misplaced, since no single case has been found in
the U.S. or Canada where a physician was actually sued for
52. E.g., Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 537 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Ariz. 1974); see
also Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp. Inc., 688 P.2d 605, 609 (Ariz. 1984) (en-
dorsing the decision in Guerrero).
53. For a state-by-state survey of 'Good Samaritan' statutes, see GIESEN, supra note
14, at 1 720.
54. But cf. Colby v. Schwartz, 78 Cal. App. 3d 885 (1978) (holding that physicians
are not protected by such statutes when working on an emergency case as part of normal
hospital routine).
55. ALLEN M. LINDEN. CANADIAN TORT LAW 227 (4th ed. 1988).
56. KEETON ET AL., supra note 32, at § 56.
57. GIESEN, supra note 14, at % 133.
58. Harrison v. British Rys. Bd., [1981] 3 All E.R. 679 (Eng. Q.B.).
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malpractice arising out of treatment rendered at the scene of
an emergency. 9
It thus emerges that in common law countries, in the ab-
sence of an affirmative duty to provide emergency medical as-
sistance, a mosaic of statutory and common law obligations and
incentives has been put in place to give effect to the basic hu-
manitarian duty60 to assist another in peril. Unfortunately, we
have also seen that each of these incremental measures has met
with but partial success and, indeed, John Fleming's criticism
that the "remnants of excessive individualism [in the common
law] are apt to evoke invidious comparison with affirmative du-
ties of good neighbourliness in most countries outside the com-
mon law orbit"'" remains valid. It is submitted that a clear,
though sharply delimited and defined duty to rescue individuals
in grave need of attention should be imposed upon doctors and
hospital authorities who are in a position to do so. The cautious
judicial development of the defence of necessity, which raises
similar fears of undue intrusion upon individual liberty, 2 would
provide a useful model for the shaping of a common law duty
to rescue. 3 Furthermore, judicial interpretation of Section
323c of the German Penal Code demonstrates that the
problems of identifying the appropriate defendant and of estab-
lishing causation, which are often cited by Anglo-Saxon com-
mentators as reasons for not imposing liability for omissions,
are not insurmountable. 4 Indeed, a number of German deci-
sions indicate that, so far from there being a reduction in the
standard expected of doctors in rescue situations, as is the case
under the aforementioned Good Samaritan statutes, the extent
and quality of the assistance which they are required to provide
59. GIESEN, supra note 14, at % 721.
60. As embodied in the parable of the Good Samaritan itself. See ST. LUKE 10:25-
37.
61. FLEMING, supra note 33, at 147.
62. Southwark London Borough Council v. Williams, [1971] 1 Ch. 734 (Eng. C.A.)
(rejecting claim of a deference of "economic" necessity to an action in trespass, confined
the defence to urgent situations of imminent peril). See also FLEMING, supra note 33, at
94-98.
63. For a masterful exposition of the analogical basis for a common law duty to
rescue and a demonstration of the compatibility of such a duty with the two main philo-
sophical traditions of the common law, see Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to
Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980).
64. See ADOLF SCHONKE ET AL., STRAFGESETZBUCH: KOMMENTAR notes 1-36 to
§ 323c StGB (Penal Code) (24th ed. 1991).
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may be increased in the light of their special training and
skills. 5
IV. ETHICS, LAW AND THE PATIENT'S RIGHTS
We have seen that the failure of certain states to provide
at least a minimum of health care to their indigent members,
and the reluctance of the common law to impose a duty upon
doctors to render aid in emergency situations, are both open to
harsh criticism in the light of ethical principles generally ac-
cepted in society. However, these principles, which generate
rights to receive and obligations to provide certain forms of
medical treatment, are applicable with equal normative force to
the therapeutic relationship itself, once access to the health
care system has been obtained.
The overwhelming propensity of medical professionals to
view their task as the scientific application of all available tech-
nology to the patient has already been identified as a significant
cause of increasing costs in the health care sector. Correspond-
ingly, on this model "[d]isease manifests itself as a malfunction
in a specific area; it can be corrected or ameliorated with
proper diagnosis and reparative techniques. These techniques
usually consist of a chemical or biological agent specifically
suited to attack and render harmless the germ or biological
malfunction that caused the disease."66 Under this conception
the individual, although gaining access to medical services,
loses all rights on becoming a patient and becomes merely the
passive object of those procedures which the attending physi-
cians deem to be in his best interests.6 But if the law is to
faithfully embody the value of individual autonomy, which is at
the core of any civilized society68 and which, as we have seen,
65. Judgment 3 Ss 396/74 of Sept. 6, 1974, OLG Hamm, 1975 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFr [NJW] 604 (F.R.G.); Judgment Ss 532/56 of July 1957, OLG K6ln,
1957 NJW 1609 (F.R.G.); Judgment Ss 5/48 of Dec. 12, 1948, OLG Koblenz, 1948 NJW
489 (F.R.G.). See also Arthur Kreuzer, Die unterlassene arzliche Hilfeleistung in der
Rechtsprechung, 1967 NJW 278-281 (F.R.G.); Hans Welzel, Zur Dogmatik der echten
Unterlassungsdelikte, insbesondere des § 330c [now § 323c] StGB, 1953 NJW 327-329
(F.R.G.).
66. Sally Guttmacher, Whole in Body, Mind, and Spirit: Holistic Health and the
Limits of Medicine, 9 HASTINGS CTR. RPT., April 1979, at 15, 16.
67. This is also the focus of the scathing criticism to be found in KENNEDY, supra
note 15, at 70-75.
68. The central importance of individual autonomy in the legal and political order
has been widely acknowledged. See, e.g., Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hosp. Governors,
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generates the moral obligation upon society to provide for ac-
cess to necessary medical care, it cannot allow the medical pro-
fession to play God in this manner.6 9
As Lord Scarman stated, in his formidable dissent in
Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors:
The doctor's concern is with health and relief of pain. These
are the medical objectives. But a patient may well have in
mind circumstances, objectives and values which he may rea-
sonably not make known to the doctor but which may lead
him to a decision different from that suggested by a purely
medical opinion. The doctor's duty can be seen, therefore, to
be one which requires him not only to advise as to matters of
medical treatment but also to provide his patient with the
information needed to enable the patient to consider and bal-
ance the medical advantages and risks alongside other rele-
vant matters, such as, for example, his family, business or
social responsibilities of which the doctor may be only par-
tially, if at all informed. 70
The patient's full and valid consent is an unavoidable prerequi-
site of the legality of any diagnostic or therapeutic procedure to
which he is submitted.71 In this regard, in so far as courts in
England (or Scotland) have allowed the medical profession it-
self to set the standard of disclosure in consent cases, they have
abdicated their constitutional function to develop objective
standards of care and thereby have failed to vindicate and pro-
tect the patient's right to self-determination." In so doing, the
English and Scottish courts are out of step not only with their
counterparts in the civil law world, but also with all the other
major common law jurisdictions.
[19851 1 All E.R. 643, 649g-h (Eng.) (Scarman, L., dissenting); Schloendorff v. Society of
New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1912); GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] arts.
1-2 (F.R.G.); Judgment VI ZR 203/57 of Dec. 9, 1958, BGH, 29 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 46, 54 (F.R.G.).
69. See Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hosp. Governors, [1985] 1 All E.R. 1018, 1028a
(Eng. C.A.) (Donaldson, L.); see also GiESEN, supra note 14, at % 133.
70. Sidaway, [1985] 1 All E.R. at 652d-f (Scarman, L., dissenting).
71. See GIESEN, supra note 14, at 1 482-832 (1988) (providing a full comparative
discussion of disclosure requirements in medical law).
72. Sidaway, [1985] 1 All E.R. 643; Gold v. Haringey Area Health Authority,
[1987] 3 W.L.R. 649 (Eng. C.A.); Hunter v. Hanley, 1955 Sess. Cas. 200 (Scot.); see also
Dieter Giesen & John Hayes, The Patient's Right to Know - A Comparative View, 21
ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 101 (1992). Contra Sidaway, 1 All E.R. at 645ff (Scarman, L.,
dissenting).
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In adopting a patient-centered approach to the question of
standards of disclosure in medical malpractice actions, the Su-
preme Court of South Australia has stated that the law must
respect "the right of every human being to make decisions
which affect his own life and to determine the risks which he is
willing to undertake. ' 73 While the patient-centered perspective
of Australian and Canadian jurisprudence regarding consent to
medical treatment avoids the most lamentable shortcomings of
the deferential doctor-centered approach in Britain vis-?-vis
the medical profession, it is submitted that the qualification of
this approach by the adoption of a "reasonable patient" test
74
fails to extend due protection to the patient's fundamental
right to self-determination. The application of a test based
upon reasonableness means that the patient's "supposedly invi-
olable right to decide for himself what is done with his body is
made subject to a standard set by others. The right to base
one's consent on proper information is effectively vitiated for
those with fears, apprehensions, religious beliefs or supersti-
tions outside the mainstream of society."' 75 These words have
been echoed by the German Federal Supreme Court, which has
imposed the optimal requirement that the extent of disclosure
required of the attending doctor be determined by the subjec-
tive informational needs of the particular patient."8 As it
stated, to "respect the patient's own will is to respect his free-
dom and dignity as a human being." 7
73. F. v. R., 33 S.A. St. R. 189, 191 (Austl. 1983).
74. See, e.g., Rogers v. Whittaker, [1992] Austl. Torts R. § 81-189 (Austl.); F v. R.,
33 S.A. St. R. 189 (Austl. 1983); Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 880 (Can.); Hopp v.
Lepp, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 192 (Can.); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972).
75. McPherson v. Ellis, 287 S.E.2d 892, 897 (N.C. 1982) (emphasis added) (holding
that jury should consider what patient's decision would have been had she had been prop-
erly informed of risk of paralysis).
76. Judgment VI ZR 203/57 of Dec. 9, 1958, BGH, 29 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 46, LM § 276 [Ca] BGB No 8, 1959 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr [NJW] 811, 1959 VersR 153 (F.R.G.). See also DIETER
GIESEN. ARZTHAFTUNGSRECHT 112-120, 171, 259 (3rd ed. 1990) (F.R.G.).
77. Judgment VI ZR 203/57 of Dec. 9, 1958, BGH, 29 BGHZ 46, 53-56, LM
§ 276 [Ca] BGB No 8, 1959 NJW 811, 1959 VersR 153; see also Judgment BvR 878/74
of July 25, 1979, BVerfG, 52 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE]
1313 (F.R.G.).
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Ethical and legal issues of the most profound significance
are also integral to treatment decisions at the "edges of life.""8
A proliferation of new techniques in the field of artificial repro-
duction presents the serious threat that the pursuit of the novel
and the fashionable by medical researchers will leave the law
lagging behind and unable to fully implement society's funda-
mental ethical values.7 9 The price of medical prowess in this
area has been the destruction of countless human embryos
through cryopreservation and experimentation. In the face of
this, the law must insist that artificially conceived human life is
nurtured in the child's own interests and emphasize that that
which is medically possible is not always morally or legally ac-
ceptable. As Professor Krause has explained it, "a child is not
'medication' to be prescribed lightly to frustrated, would-be
parents . . . the greatest responsibility is owed directly to the
child."'80 Put bluntly, the law cannot allow doctors, under the
guise of fulfilling societal obligations to provide health care, to
take up the glittering stones of human genes and embryonic life
and piece together mosaics at random, in accordance with their
scientific whims or curiosity.
Similarly, at the other "end of life," technological develop-
ments have enabled doctors to prolong the lives of many termi-
nally and hopelessly ill patients (i.e. those in a persistent vege-
tative state).81 In these circumstances it is again essential that
the medical profession is not allowed to play God with human
life. The law must reflect its strong commitment both to indi-
vidual autonomy and the sanctity of human life in regulating
this area of medical practice.82
78. See PAUL RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGE OF LIFE: MEDICAL AND LEGAL INTER-
SECTIONS (1978). The importance of the ethical issues at the end of life are discussed in
GIESEN, supra note 14, at 938-983, 1324, 1328, 1360-1375, 1391, 1405-1416, 1424-
1441, 1460-1493.
79. The legal and ethical aspects of artificial reproduction are discussed in GIESEN,
supra note 14, at 1 1343-1416.
80. Harry D. Krause, Artificial Conception" Legislative Approaches, 19 FAM. L.Q
185, 206 (1985).
81. GIESEN, supra note 14, at 932-987.
82. These were the central concerns of the U.S. Supreme Court in its recent decision
in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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V. CONCLUSION
It has been seen that an ethically consistent approach
must inform both provisions for initial access to health care
and the legal regulation of treatment once this access has been
achieved. Discussion of patients' rights is of little significance if
individuals are excluded in limine from necessary medical ser-
vices due to poverty or geographical happenstance. But corre-
spondingly, individuals must be ensured the full enjoyment of
their basic human rights once they have entered the system.
Common to our consideration of issues of access, consent to
treatment and procedures undertaken at the edges of life was
the tendency noted among medical professionals to conceive of
themselves as the agents of an ever-advancing science, free
from ethical and legal constraints. This self-image is fostered
by the process of "socialization" and "role modelling" which
doctors-in-training undergo. A firm sprit de corps is generated
and indeed a doctor's primary duty, as embodied in the Hippo-
cratic Oath, 3 is not to his patient or to society but to his fellow
practitioners."' In the words of Ian Kennedy of King's College
at London, a result of this veneer of scientific invincibility: "we
[the public] have come almost to believe in magic cures and
the waving of wands. The reality has been a constant disap-
pointment. The promised or expected cures are not there." 85
Doctors are, therefore, better advised to view their relationship
with their individual patients and with society as a whole as
one of fiduciary partnership in the furtherance of the basic
human values of life and personal autonomy through the pro-
motion and preservation of health. As was said by three of the
eight judges on Germany's highest court, the German Federal
Constitutional Court, in a landmark medical malpractice
decision:
Trust cannot be demanded one-sidedly by the physician
alone. Endeavors are right to place the burden of a physician-
patient relationship not only on the shoulders of the physician
but to distribute them more evenly by making the patient co-
operate and assume his own part of responsibility for his
83. An English translation of the Oath is printed in STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTION-
ARY 716-17 (25th ed. 1990).
84. For a discussion of the tendency of professionals to follow one another, see GIE-
SEN, supra note 14, at 11 1471-1527.
85. KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 46.
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health . . . Co-operation, a real physician-patient dialogue
and a general strengthening of the patient's sensitivity of
their own responsibility will only be possible where the pa-
tient first of all is made an active participant and thus has
received the information relevant to his medical care...
What is required then is that the physician shares with the
patient all the inherent uncertainties and risks, unless the pa-
tient has made it clear that he does not want more informa-
tion. In this way the patient will be made privy to the knowl-
edge about his situation and the inherent risks, a consequence
which he will not escape anyway if he consents to treatment.
This makes him a responsible partner of the physician.86
86. Judgment of July 25, 1979, BVerfG, 52 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassung-
sgerichgts [BVerfGE] 131, at 171ff (Hirsch, J.) (F.R.G.); id. at 179 (Niebler & Stein-
berger, J.J.). For a more comprehensive discussion of the text-related issues, see Giesen,
supra note 7 (comparative references).
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